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JAPANESE Fil可ANCIALLIBERALIZATION 
一FromWhen田 ItC副ne-
Dem由 C.McComac 
The past two decades have witnessed a wave of fmancial liberalization 
of mternational banking and capital markets h日spon田 tochanges泊
the world’s economic environment. m Britain deregulated mterest rates 
in the early 1970s, abolished foreign exchange controls in世田late1970s 
and ended the London stock exchange cartel in the“big bang" of 1986. 
In也eUnited States, Wall Street underwent its stock exch皿 ge“big
b朗自”加 1975and interest rates were fully freed in the early 1980s as 
mflationary forces precipitated disintermedia世on.
The liberalization of Japan’s fmancial markets飴stbegan m the nud-
1970s spurred on by the 1973-74 oil price shock and the subsequent end 
of the 1955 to 1973 High Growth Period (HGP). Japanese financial 
hberahzation, however, has not paralleled that of its economic counter-
parts despite Japan’s emergence as也eworld’s largest creditor nation. 
The speed and degree of financial liberalization has generally Jagged 
behind that of the United States and Europe hindering the ab出tyof 
Japan’s financial markets to keep pace wr由 theeconomic strength of 
the country. Change has been gradual at best四drestnctions and dis-
mcentives to血efree flow of capital are prevalent even today. 
The focus of this paper is to add to the understanding of the factors 
mfluencing the speed and degree of Japanese fmancial liberalization. 
To do so, it 1s nece田町yto examme the fmanc1al environment prior to 
liberalization and the conditions which fostered the liberalizatton process. 
Part I discusses也estruc臼reof吐国Japanesefmancial system during the 
High Growth Period and Part I investigates the financial conditions 
which Jed up to the m1tial liberalizat10n proce田．
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I. The Post-War Financial Structure-The High Growth Period 
The end of World War I left the Japanese nation in economic and 
fmancial ruin Supplies of raw matenals皿dcapital were scarce, putt泊E
severe constraints on production activities. To foster economic growth 
it was necessary to develop a financial system which would provide a 
conduit for transferring needed financial resources to the deficit sectors 
of the economy. This would create阻 economicenvironment conducive 
to encouraging investment, industrialization, and exports. To Jap田l's
benefit，血efmancial system, which was instituted under the regula世on
and adrninistrative guid皿ceof the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the 
B叩kof Japan (BO乃contributedto just such四 en吋ronment.Highly 
structured, regulated, and segmented this system formed the roots of 
the modern Japanese fmancial system叩 dis generally credited with 
playing a m句orcontributmg role in the economic“miracle”of the 
High Growth Period.'" 
An important aspect of the fmanc1al system of the HGP was the 
relatively stable flow of funds pattern (Table I). 
The personal sector was charac匝rizedby large surpluses, averaging 9.2 
percent of GNP for the period 1965-1972. While both the public and 
corporate sectors were m deficit, the public sector deficit was relatively 
small for the same period. The co甲oratedeficit, for example, averaged 
6.2 percent of GNP while出atof the public averaged only 2.6 percent of 
GNP. The stability of this flow of funds pattern provided a favorable 
cl加atein which to carry out the policy aims of the regulating au th or-
itJes-namely, the transfer of the田中lusesof the personal sector to 
fmance廿1edeficits of the corporate sector. 1' 
Several import皿tcharactens!Jcs of the financial environment of 
Japan, particularly with regard to the fmancing of corporate deficits, 
durmg世田HGPare evident "' 
(1) The Predominance of Indi；同ctFinancing 
First, and perhaps血emost回lientfeature of the financial system 
during the HGP, was the predommance of indrrect fmancing. '" Japanese 
fmanc1al ms!Jtutions obtained a majority of血eirfmancing needs from 
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financial insl!tut10ns as opposed to raising funds in the capital or equity 
markets ( duect f泊四cing).Jnduect fmancmg accounted for over 85 0 
percent of由ecorporate sectors source of funds for 1965-1972 and 
reached over 90 percent m 1973 Table 2 shows the extent to which the 
corporate sector used external funds for their borrowing needs for the 
years 1964, 1970, and 1974. 
In a study of bo血 theUnited States and Japanese finan ロalsystems, 
Cargill，同 calsthis phenomenon“one of the most sign出cantdiffer-
ences between the two systems，” noting that for the United States in 
1973 only 75.0 percent of corporate sector funds were raised through 
Table l Surplus or Deficit （ー）Position of Major 
Nonfrnancial Sectors in Japan, 1965-1975 
(As a percent of GNP) 
Public Sector 
Year Pe al Corporate Central Public Corporation Total rs on Bu困ne田 Government& Local Authorities 
1965 7.9 -4.5 0.0 -3 2 3.2 
1966 9.1 4.8 -0.8 -3.3 4.1 
1967 9.4 -73 0.7 -2.4 3.1 
1968 9.1 -6.7 。 -2.8 -2.8 
1969 8.7 6.9 0.6 2.2 2.8 
1970 8.2 7.2 1.3 -2.3 1.0 
1971 9.6 -6.3 0.9 -2.8 -1.9 
1972 11.5 -7.9 0.6 3.3 -2.7 
19ヲ3 8.8 7.6 1.1 -3.9 2.8 
1974 10.3 -8.5 0.7 -4.4 -3 7 
1975 10.5 4.1 2.7 -4.6 -7.3 
1976 11.4 3.9 -3.5 -4.1 7.6 
1977 11.2 -2.6 4.0 -3.3 7.3 
1978 11.1 -1.0 5 . 4 -3.7 -9.1 
1979 9.2 -3.l 4.5 -3.5 -8.0 
1965-72 
average 9.2 -6.5 0.2 -2.8 -2.6 
Source: Bank of Jap却，Flowof Funds Accounts 
Note: Flow of funds positions are on a calendar year basis The personal sector 
includes households and unincorporated businesses 
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indirect financing. 
The factors contributing to this predommance of mdirect fmancing 
are numerous.刷 First,the equity叩 dcapital markets were considerably 
underdeveloped. Equities were not an attractive funding source because 
of血etax advantage of debt over equity, because of the practice of 
issu泊gstock at par value rather than market value, and because of the 
existing regulations regardmg new stock issue. 18 Crum叩 dMeerschwarn 19
claim曲目“eqmtyf白血C泊EC田neto be seen田 moreof a way to cement 
a long-term relat10nship ra血erth皿 asa purely fmanc1al transaction or 
as a way to exercise co甲oratecontrol." Companies, for ex副η，pie,sold 
new equity at par value giving existing shareholders the right to purchase 
at bargain prices resul世ngin permanent shareholder relationships. But 
出ispracl!ce was not cost-effective, and thus, loans obtained from banks 
became吐iepreferred form of new capital. 
The immature capital markets have also been attributed to the low 
stock of financial assets held by the non-fmancial sectors (pr加arily也e
public）.＂明也 lowstock of蹴 ets,ar思10Hamada皿dHoriuchi, made 
tr叩 sactionscosts in fmancial markets quite substantial, contributmg to 
the personal sector’s concentration of savings担 theform of bank and 
Table 2 Funds Raised by the Corporate Sector Externally 
{billion yen) 
Year 1964 1970 1974 
Borrowmgs 3426 9417 13129 
from private 
fmancialms首相tions 3056 8546 11611 
from govermnent 
f回血白almsti加lions 369 871 1517 
Securi世es 923 1347 1414 
Forei』担credits,etc. 297 431 1447 
Total 4646 11195 15990 
Sour田： BOJEconom1c Research Department, Special Papers 
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postal-sav泊gsdepoSJts ‘＇Thus, the low level of accumulated financial 
assets and the associated transaction cos臼 allowedthe banking sector 
to become a predomin叩 tinfluence Il postwar fmancial markets.” 
The underdevelopment of世田 secunt1esmarket was mfluenced by 
the central gover町nent'sstrict policy of maintainmg, at least up until 
1965, a balanced budget. Although public corporations and local 
authonl!es were in debt positions, the surpluses of the central govern-
ment contnbuted to the absence of any significant government debt up 
until the 1970s.'" 
Tight controls on international capital flows, which effectively isolated 
the domestic fmancial markets, also prevented the development of a 
bond market for outside debt. 
(2) Parゆlioand Interest Rate Cons剛山
Second, there were significant portfolio and mterest rate constramts 
on m句orpartic1p阻 tsm也efmancial markets. Government au也onties 
determined most interest rates, and世田宜n皿cialsystem was divided into 
various segments, each su旬ectto certam borrowing and lending restric-
lions. 
官官由主teenlargest commercial banks, based泊 majorpop叫ati on 
centers (appropriately tenned city ba凶四：）， were也em司orsource of 
short-tenn lending to the domesl!c co甲oratesector, primarily large 
corporations Regional banks, smaller in size and primanly located in 
rural, agricultural areas, were also mvolved in short-tenn lending, but 
mainly to small and mid-size firms. Long-tenn credit阻 dtrust banks 
provided long句termfunds for industry. Funds were nnsed by these in-
stitutions through bank debentures issued at regula恒dinter田trates. 
Trust bank funds were raised by acceptmg deposits of more th叩 two
years. 
An important role in the transfer of funds was also played by pubhc 
fmancial insl!tutions, which mcluded credit associations, credit coopera-
tives, and agricultural cooperal!ves. These institutions served to allocate 
fm叩 cialresources m血ingiven geographic areas for long-term credit 
needs at reduced rates of mterest In add1t旧民血epostal saVIngs system, 
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with over 22,000 branches nationwide had the abihty to collect阻
enormous amount of deposits.羽田 relativesafety, high rate of retum, 
and tax advantage of postal deposits made出ssystem a pop叫aralter-
native to bank deposits and provided the government wi白 neededfunds. 
官官 proportionof government funds to世田tot叫amountof long-term 
equipment funds supplied to private businesses was high du由自由e
1960s, providing evidence of the importance of gove口四1entfunds m世1e
economy." 
The concept of market segmentation was, and remains to this day, an 
叩 tstan ding阻 dunique免atureof Jap組、financialsystem.°' It provided 
the financial regulators with the tools to channel funds to specific 
markets along a path predetermined by the regulators themselves. 
The constraints on interest rates were based on the Temporary Interest 
Rate Adjustment Act of 1947, which allowed出eMOF to set not only 
the discount rate but ahnost叫lothers as well. Interest rates were, for 
the most part, set below market rates based on the assumption that, by 
reducmg fmancmg costs, investment and exports would be stimulated. 
The effectiveness of this policy, and廿1eextent to which mterest rates 
were fixed, however, has come into question by more than one wnter." 
Bank of Japan economist Yoshio Suzuki"' W口testhat“1t is unclear 
as to whether the pohcy of artiflClal supp回目10nof mterest rates actually 
lowered the financial cos臼 ofJapanese corporations”His reasoning is 
based on the fact that in addition to controlled interest rates, certain 
fmancial markets were formed in which interest rates were determmed 
freely, so that the “effective”泊terestrates borne by firms did not 
remain low, as intended by policy. There was, in fact, a dual structure 
of interest rates加 force.Al也oughsavings deposits, i田ueterms for 
bonds, bank debentures, and loan trust rates were fixed, there were 
relatively freer rates which mcluded cal rates, the b迎discountrate, the 
gensaki, or repurchase agreement rate, and bond yields in the secondary 
market. These “freer”rates were higher than controlled ra臼s.阿 Hamada
and Hormchi " note that the pohcy of requiring a“compensating bal-
ance”reduced the effectiveness of the regulation of interest rates as it 
raised the effective mterest rates to a level much higher than也eregu-
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lated nominal rates. And they conclude that the effectiveness of the 
regulation of mterest rates has yet to be adequately explamed. 
Even if the artificial suppress10n of inter田trate theory is rejected, the 
importance of血.einterest rate and portfolio constraints on financial 
institutions c皿 bebased on the grounds由atthey prevented competit10n 
among the various fmancial institutions which created a stable environ-
ment from which the Government, particularly the Ba叫仁ofJapan, could 
carry its pohcy aims." Accordmg to Suzuki，＇’ interest rate controls-
particularly those on deposit mt町田trates and the segmenta世onof 
banking mto long-term and short-term financial busmesses are the 
primary forces which contributed to stability within the fmancial system. 
And as a result of世田atmosphere,he argues，“financial institu世onswere
able to respond to the flounshing demand for funds by corporations.” 
{3）刀zeConcept of Over/oan and Overborrowing 
百tird，世田bankingsector was constantly ma state of overloan阻dthe 
corporate sector was in a state of overborrowmg.側 Thestate of overloan 
denoted a condition in血eprivate sector m which banks extended more 
credit白血 theyacquired from their deposits or own capital, while over-
borrowmg referred to the heavy rehance on external sourc潤 ofcapital 
by the corporate sector. Banks in this overloan position, prrrnarily the 
city banks, were able to obtain funds from the Bank of Japan. This put 
the city banks in也eposition of being chronically in debt to the BOJ. 
The corporate sector, meanwhile, obtained funds from世田 banking
sector. '" 
The factors contributing to the over!oan and overborrowing charac-
teristics of the financial sector are s加盟arin nature to血oseidentified 
with indirect fmance i e , interest rate constraints.τhe low rates of 
mterest served to create祖国国間 demandfor funds in也ecorporate 
sector which was further intensified by世田 rapid阻teof economic 
growth. As equity fmancing was rare, borrowing from the Bank of 
Japan was the only viable alternative；叩d世田BOJwaswill加Eto supply 
世田向ndsdemanded. 
The important aspect of th担 overloan-overborrowingposition was 
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not so much in how it affected吐iebalance shee白 of也ebanking and 
corporate sectors, but that江田町田da close relationship between the 
B剖tlcof Japan and ffaancial mstitutions This enabled世田 BOJto 
allocate credit to也oseareas where it would have a maximum effect on 
economic development. 
The use of dJScretionary monetary policy was limited by the fIXed 
exchange阻tereg加eof the Bretton Woods system which prevailed 
pnor to 1973. The need for the goveロunentto maintain fixed exchange 
parities meant that domestic monetary policy was subject to foreign 
influen由民阻d世田 needto maintam balance of paymen臼e伊山bnum
produced a wide range of fluctuations in the growth rate of血emoney 
supply.倒
Bank of Japan policy was, however, a major force in the economy 
The m勾orpolicy instruments of the Bank of Japanー creditrationing 
at the discount window, variations in the discount rate, purchases and 
sales of commerc1al bils in the mterbank market, and loan limits on 
indiVJdual banks referred to as“window guidance”一 wereused to 
control the cost and volume of loans to the corporate sector by fmanc1al 
institutions.”Given廿官 relianceof the banking sector on the BOJ for 
lo叩 s( overloan), along with the predomm叩 ceof mdirect fmancing in 
the business sector, the BOJ was able to regula臼 creditcreation by 
varying the amount of reserves available to the bankmg system At the 
domestic level, BOJ policy was transmitted through changes in. the 
amount of credit available to the fmancial system and血us，血eBOJ W出
able to influence the level of corporate mvestment spending. Th担in・
vestment spending played a prmc1pal role m determinmg the level of 
aggregate demand and, hence, the overall level of economic activity. As 
Crum and Meerschwarn note: 
“The Bank of Japan and the MmJStry of Fmance, working together, 
encouraged a national fmanc1al environment由atprovided overall 
stability阻 dfostered desired economic development By limiting 
也e._iternativ回目白！ableto suppliers and demanders of funds, and 
through skilf1叫 useof a regulated environment that nurtured 
strong interdependencies and ex1stmg relationships, the Bank and 
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the Ministry succeeded in both shaping Japanese industrial policy 
血 din mainta四国Etheir own power'-'" 
I. The Ca白lystfor Financial L1be四lization
百iefinancial structure of the High Growth Period served也eeconomy 
well. Economic growth averaged IO percent也IOU出世間early1970s and 
Jap田l'sposition m the world economy expanded at a similar rate. This 
unprecedented economic exp叩 s10nc町田 toa四ddenhalt, however, 
with也eonset of血eFirst O丑Crisisin 1973-74.百世sdecline in econolil・
ic activity was evtdenced m血echanging flow of funds pattern. 
First, the supply-side shock reduced the demand for capital叩 dde-
creased the deficits of the corporate sector (re自己rto Table !). Second 
and more unportantly, the slower econonuc grow也 ledto significant 
changes担 thegovernment debt position. Government debt increased 
in both real terms and as proport10n of GNP, severely constraimng the 
existing financial order. Th担wasthe primary factor which put into play 
the forces of financial liberalization. " 
The Government Bond M11Tket and the Role of Government Debt 
The macroeconomic management of Japan during the postwar eco・
nomic development period w田 prunarilymonetary. Contrary to血e
practice in other developed countries, fiscal policy was not used penodi-
cally to boost廿ielevel of economic activity." An economic downturn 
in 1964-65, however, produ田dchanges加 thisstate of afairs. 百回
目出町田C回目 ofmonet町ypolicy to counter recessionary gaps was not 
repeated and a fiscal policy focusing on increased gove口四国ntspending 
provided the only alternative solution. And, s泊cethe slowdown also 
produced shortfalls m t阻 revenues,paymg for thtS spending entailed 
deficit financing. 
Financing the ftScal defici包 requiredthe absorption of government 
bonds包tothe balance sheets of the fmancial sector. But the condi-
tions of bond issue by the Jap四esegovernment were subject to strict 
regulations and special authorization Jaws needed to be passed before 
new debt could be tSsued Public placement of bonds was forbidden 
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by the BOJ, for fe町 ofexcess money creation, and instead bonds were 
re吐uiredto be placed directly With purchasers. 
Placmg the debt directly with purchasers could be accomphshed 
either through public tender or issuing the debt by public flotation. 
These two options, however, put白egovernment au出ontiesm a policy 
dtlemma. Such me由odsof debt issue, although popular in deregulated 
markets, implied白atthe level of the interest rate would be determined 
in the marketplace. Thus, direct placement required gi吋ngup control 
of some interest rates a solut10n the BOJ and the MOF did not deem 
feasible at血attime 
The solution to the problem of placmg government debt was ac-
complished伽 ough也ecreation of a bond underwriting syndicate, 
comprised of a broad r四 geof financial mst1tutions, includmg banks and 
securities compames. Briefly descnbed, the syndicate would buy the 
bonds directly from the MOF at a predetermined rate with the under-
standmg曲目 thebonds would not be resold for a penod of one year.旬
Th包arrangementallowed the authorities to set a relatively low interest 
rate on new issues. 
Prior to 1977, an official secondary market for government debt was 
prohibited by the Ministry of Fmance. Al也oughsecunties companies 
operated叩 unofficialgensald market泊 gover町田ntdebt, the limited 
size of the market had litle impact on the system. The syndicate was 
originally willing to hold the debt since the BOJ agreed to repurchase the 
bonds at a price high enough to gu町四teethe syndicate members a suf-
ficient profit. And even though this purch田eof debt did result in a 
certain degree of money creation, ag剖n也elimited size of the market 
helped to keep inflation under control during the first few years. 
The forces of financial hberalization came mto play with the increased 
demand on the 抑制icsector to counter the rece田ionaryef自己ctof the 
oil-shock of 1973-74. This resulted in a rapid expansion of the町nount
of government bonds floated Initially, this development did not signifi-
cantly alter the original relationship between the BOJ四dthe syndicate. 
But, pressures on the system began to build when由eBank of Japan, 
responding to cnticISm of excessive money growth m 血e1971-73 
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period, ended i白policyof ful repurchase. Th恒leftthe syndicate with 
large quantities of bonds m their portfolios, which proceeded to lose 
value as mterest rates rose during世田economicslowdown 
With the absence of an official secondary market the syndicate was, 
as expected, hesitant to con百四eto purchase也egovernment debt.τnis 
forced the monetary au由ontiesto alter their previous restrictions and 
begmnmg担 April1977, the syndicate was given permi田ionto sel the 
bonds in a secondary market one year after their m叩eThe emergence of 
a secondary market also made it more difficult for the MOF to issue 
fIXed rate long-term bonds. Thus, m response, the MOF began to i田ue
medmm-term bonds at public auctions in 1978. The un田gulatednature 
of the secondary market meant that mterest rates were market-deter-
mined, makmg large denominatrnn deposits with mterest rate ceilings 
les attractive This fostered shifts m deposits to higher yielding assets 
and st!Il1ulated an extraordinary expansrnn in bond training in the 
secondary markets. Both of these developments are indications of note-
worthy change in adjustment mechanism in the Japanese financial 
system” 
There were other, though somewhat leser, pressures for change at 
both the domestic and international level The declining mvestment 
opportunities of the corporate sector altered the previous close relation-
ship between the banking and busmess sectors. Corporations became 
les reliant on mdirect fmancing for their external funding needs which 
resulted in reduced profit opportunities for the bankmg sector. This 
forced banks to seek new ways to expand their lending activ1t1es and 
increased competition 町nongthe various segments of the bankmg 
mdustry 
The corporate and personal sectors also contnbuted to changes m 
the fmanc1al structure through也阻 searchfor higher日tesof田turn
and lower costs of borrowing As corporations began to look to the 
international market in an effort to diversify their portfolios, increased 
demands for freer capital flows were forthcoming. This spurred the crea-
l!on m the domestic market of new financial instruments with more 
flexible rates of mterest to compete with those from abroad.凶
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皿.Conclusion 
This essay has focused on two major aspects of the postwar Japanese 
飴1回目alsystem: (!) the highly structured and regulated system which 
provided血eenv江onmentconducive to economic growth, and (2) the 
changes泊血担enviromnentwhich led up to financial liberalization. In 
particular, it has shown that the forces of liberalization mitially came 
into play as a result of the failure of the regulated system to absorb the 
increased government deficits And once liberalization began in one 
fmancial sector it put pressure on the other sectors to liberalize as well 
A complete hst of al the changes that have taken place in the fmancial 
markets of Japan since the end of the High Growth Period is beyond 
the scope of吐tispaper. Moreover, the fmanc1al markets of Japan are 
contmuously ad1usting to the changing economic enviromnent.側 But
despite these many developments, the domestic market st出 remains
higl甘yregulated. The globalization of Japan’s financial markets is not 
yet a reality, and cals for吐iefurther Ji白ingof controls on mterest四tes,
deregulating fmancial transactions within Japan, and increasing access 
to世間 domesl!cmarket by foreign fmancial institutions st出回main.
Regulation h田longbeen a part of世田Japanesemarket, and，出evidenced
from the suc回目。f血e四位GrowthPeriod, it has served a useful pur-
pose Nevertheless, today it is no longer a question of whether further 
hberalizat10n is gomg to continue, but rather to what degree and speed. 
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日本の金融の自由化
〈要約〉
デニス c.7 コーナック
日本の金融市場の自由化は，まず1970年代中頃からはじまり， 1973
74年の石油価格ショックによって加速され， 1955年から1973年まで続い
た高度成長の終りを画している。日本の金融市場の自由化は，しかしな
がら，日本が世界最大の債権固となったにもかかわらず，経済の他の側
面と同じ速度で進められたのでFはなかった。金融自由化的速度と程度は，
合衆国やヨーロッパ諸国より一般的にいって遅れており，日本の金融市
場の能力を，国の経済力の発展と比較した場合，むしろこれを隠すよう
なものであった。変化はよくいって漸次的なものであり，資本の自由な
流れを制限し，また阻害する面が，今日においても目立っているのであ
る。
本論文の中心点は，日本の金融市場の自由化の速度と程度に影響を及
ぽした要因の理解に資することである。そのためには，自由化以前の金
融環境と自由化の過程を促進した諸条件を吟味することが必要である。
第 I部は高度成長期の日本の金融制度内構造を論ずるものであり，また
第I昔日は最初の自由化的過程へと導いた金融上の諸条件を考察するもの
である。
